LIABILITY UNDER RULE 10b-5 FOR
NEGLIGENTLY MISLEADING CORPORATE
RELEASES: A PROPOSAL FOR THE
APPORTIONMENT OF LOSSES
The determination of liability and the assessment of
damages for materially misleading statements made by corporations in connection with the sale of their securities has long been
troublesome.' By definition, a materially misleading statement
has an impact on the decisions made by investors with regard to
securities issued by the corporation in question.2 A misleading
statement made to a single investor in a face-to-face transaction
may involve only a small loss or gain. However, when a
statement in a nationally published press release is materially
misleading, all investors may be exposed to it and may make
investment decisions relying on it. Such a situation can involve
thousands of investors and millions of dollars in damages.
As a matter of equity, there can be little doubt that a
corporation should bear the losses caused by its fraudulent or
knowingly misleading public statements. On the other hand,
imposition of liability for a statement that is misleading only
because of negligence in its preparation 3 is a more difficult issue;
'Materially misleading statements or omissions in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities are proscribed by § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970), which makes it unlawful to
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors;
and by rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973), promulgated pursuant thereto,
providing: It shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
W to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c)to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
2 the purchase or sale of any security.
"The basic test of 'materiality' . . . is whether 'a reasonable man would attach
importance [to the fact misrepresented] in determining his choice of action in the
transaction in question.' " List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965) (quoting RESTATEMENTOFTORTS § 538(2) (a) (1938)).
3
Whether fraudulently or negligently prepared, statements not in connection with
the sale or purchase of securities fall outside the scope of the civil liability provisions of
the federal securities laws. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(1970), dealing with false and incomplete registration statements, and § 12 of the
Securities Act of 1933, ia § 771, dealing with prospectuses and other communications,
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it may appear undesirable to impose heavy damages for such a
relatively slight degree of fault. This Comment will discuss some
of the problems inherent in cases arising under rule 1Ob-5 4 which
involve negligently misleading public statements and press
releases. It will suggest that losses in such cases are best spread
among all the parties involved. These parties include the
corporation and its preexisting shareholders, as well as those
investors who bought or sold relying on the misleading
corporate statement. It will be suggested that, in cases of
negligence, the resolution of conflicting policies requires a
measure5 of damages less rigorous than an "all-or-nothing"
liability.

I. THE Texas GulfSulphur CASE

The extensive litigation arising over a press release that was
issued by the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company (TGS) 6 on April 12,
apply only to those plaintiffs who purchased securities from the defendant corporation.
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, id. § 78j (b), applies to deceptive
devices used in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Section 18(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, id. § 78r(a), applies only to misleading statements and
misrepresentations contained in documents filed under the Exchange Act.
417 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).

5
We thus follow the lead of the Supreme Court inJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426, 433-35 (1964), which held that the federal courts are not bound by rigid rules in
shapin their judgments under the securities laws to the equities of individual cases:
Ilt is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are
necessary to make effective the congressionarpurpose .... It is for federal
courts 'to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief' when
federally secured rights are invaded.

Id. at 433. See notes 44-57 infra & accompanying text.
'The Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation, further described in notes 7-28 infra &
accompanying text, includes 4 different actions and 24 reported opinions. In
chronological order, the opinions are as follows, with the number on the left serving to
indicate to which separate action the opinion belongs:
I

SEC v. TGS

258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)

2

TGS v. Ritter

371 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1967)

1
3

SEC v. TGS
Cannon v. TGS

401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)
47 F.R.D. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)

1
3

Coates v. SEC
Astor v. TGS

394 U.S. 976 (1969)
306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)

2
2

Reynolds v. TGS 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970)
Reynolds v. TGS 309 F. Supp. 566 (D. Utah 1970)

I

SEC v. TGS

312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)

findings of fact
and law
denial of writs of
mandamus and
prohibition
rev'g
establish a class
action
cert. denied
motions for summary
judgment
held for plaintiffs
denial of class
action
violations;
remedies
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19647 presents the obvious departure point for an analysis of
judicial interpretation of rule 10b-5 in the context of a
misleading corporate disclosure.8 Although the basic ficts of that
case are well known, a brief restatement will be helpful. 9 TGS
had been exploring for minerals in eastern Canada for several
years when it discovered a potentially rich ore site in late 1963.
Initial drilling indicated a great likelihood of an inordinately rich
copper strike. Two major New York Newspapers quickly
reported rumors of the strike. Officers of TGS countered almost
immediately by issuing the now-famous press release of April 12,
1964, denying the accuracy of the rumors, reporting that most of
the findings onsite were valueless, and generally espousing a
pessimistic view of the explorations. In fact, TGS officers were
fairly certain that a rich ore site had been found. Four days after
the initial press release, TGS issued a detailed statement
announcing a strike of at least 25 million tons of ore. In the
4

Fink v. Coates

323 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)

3

Cannon v. TGS

323 F. Supp. 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)

denial of collateral
estoppel
from 309 F. Supp.
548
denial of collateral
estoppel
from Reynolds and
SECv. TGS

2

Mitchell v. TGS

446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971)

3
1
3

Cannon v. TGS
SEC v. TGS
Cannon v. TGS

53 F.R.D. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971)
53 F.R.D. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)

1

SEC v. TGS

331 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)

3

Cannon v. TGS

55 F.R.D. 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)

TGS v. Mitchell
TGS v. SEC
TGS v. SEC
TGS v. Mitchell
Reynolds v. TGS
Cannon v. TGS
In re TGS
Litigation

404 U.S. 1004 (1971)
404 U.S. 1005 (1971)
404 U.S. 1064 (1972)
404 U.S. 1064 (1972)
405 U.S. 918 (1972)
55 F.R.D. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
344 F. Supp. 1398 (J.P.M.L. 1972)

aff'g; modifying
damage formula
motions denied
appeal of remedies
motion to revoke
class status denied
order as to defendant Kline
denial of certain
classes
cert. denied
cert. denied
rehearing denied
rehearing denied
cert. denied
settlement
transfer to S.D.N.Y.

Cannon class = all persons who sold TGS stock between 4-12-64 and 10:55 a.m. on
4-16-64, at $33 or less, in reliance on 4-12-64 press release.
7
SEC
8

v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262,292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
The litigation was complicated by the presence of insider trading, but this issue is
analytically distinct and was treated separately from the question of the misleading press
release.
9
For exhaustive renditions of these facts, see Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
446 F.2d 90, 93-95 (10th Cir. 1971); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
843-47 (2d Cir. 1968); Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548, 551-56
(D. Utah 1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 268-75, 292-94
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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following month, the price of TGS stock nearly doubled.' 0 Three
major lawsuits against TGS followed.
The first was an action by the SEC, seeking a permanent
injunction barring the company from issuing further misleading
press releases." Reversing the trial court's finding that the press
release, while loomy and incomplete, was neither misleading
nor deceptive, the Second Circuit en banc adopted a negligence standard for the determination whether injunctive relief
should issue. The case was remanded for findings on whether the
April 12 press release would have misled the reasonable investor13
and whether TGS had used due diligence in issuing it.
Although the court expressly did not decide whether mere
negligence would subject TGS to liability in a private damage
suit,' five of the nine judges went beyond the issues before them
to express their opposition to such a standard. 5
The second major action against TGS was instituted by six
plaintiffs, seeking damages, in the District of Utah. 16 The trial
court found the release "misleading, intentionally deceptive,
inaccurate, and knowingly deficient in material facts."" On
appeal the Tenth Circuit held that this result, while correct,
overstated the plaintiffs' burden. The defendant corporation had
10309 F. Supp. at 564 n.23.
"SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
121d. at 296.
13401 F.2d at 863. After describing the requirement that a reasonable investor must
have been misled by the release before an injunction would issue, the court stated:
We hold only that, in an action for injunctive relief, the district court has the
discretionary power under Rule lob-5 and Section 10(b) [of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,.15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970)] to issue an injunction, if
the misleading statement resulted from a lack of due diligence on the part of
TGS.
Id.
14See id. The Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have discarded the scienter
requirement-adopting a negligence standard-in private damage actions involving
face-to-face transactions. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cerL
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965);
Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 823 (E.D.
Wis. 1962) (dictum), af'fd, 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963). A district court in the
Fourth Circuit has indicated that negligence is sufficient to establish liability under rule
10b-5, and that scienter is unnecessary. Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 545, 549 (D.
Md. 1971).
One Third Circuit judge has opined that all of the language in the above cases
dispensing with the scienter requirement is dictum. Kohn v. American Metal Climax,
Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 286 (3d Cir.) (Adams,J, concurring & dissenting), cert denied, 409
U.S. 874 (1972).
l'401 F.2d at 866-67 (FriendlyJo), 869 (Kaufman & AndersonJJ.), 870-89 (Moore,

J., & Lumbard, CJ., dissenting) (Moore and Lumbard would not even grant an

injunction
based on a negligently prepared release).
16Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970). TGS tried
unsuccessfully to have this action transferred to the Southern District of New York.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Ritter, 371 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1967).
1"309 F. Supp. at 563-64.
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"the burden of proving that [it] did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known" of the
inaccuracies in the release-a negligence standard.18 The
measure of damages adopted was "the amount it would have
taken [a reasonable investor] to invest in the TGS market within
a reasonable period of time after he became informed of the
April 16 release." 19 The total recovery was relatively small,
however; this action involved only 2,020 shares of TGS stock.2 °
The third major action against TGS was a class action
representing a potential 364,000 shares of TGS stock. 21 The trial
court, refusing to apply collateral estoppel with respect to either
the SEC action or the Utah litigation,"" read the dictum of the
Second Circuit 23 to mean that "plaintiffs must show more than
that the April 12 press release was negligently prepared. They
must show some degree of scienter." 2 r The class action and all
other private actions brought against TGS in the Southern
District of New York were finally settled early in 1972.25
In only one of the three major actions did the court cast the
test of liability for private damages in terms of negligence.2 6 The
Second Circuit impliedly rejected the negligence standard in
18446 F.2d at 102 (quoting Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348,357 (10th Cir. 1970)).
19d. at 105. Concluding that a reasonable investor would have learned of the April
16 release by April 20, and that 9 trading days thereafter (through May 1) gave the
investor a reasonable time to decide whether or not to reinvest, the court awarded
damages equal to the difference between plaintiffs' sale price and $59, the highest price
reached by TGS stock between April 20 and May 1. The trial court had used a different
measure. It awarded the difference between the sale price and $50.75, the average of the
highest daily prices reached during the reasonable time of 20 trading days after the April
16 release. 309 F. Supp. at 563-65.
20309 F. Supp. at 556.
21
Camnon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 47 F.R.D. 60, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The class
was composed of those who sold TGS stock between April 12 and 10:55 a.m. on April 16,
inclusive, in reliance on the April 12 release. Id. at 61; Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 22323 F. Supp. 990, 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 323 F. Supp. 990, 992-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Fink23v. Coates, 323 F. Supp. 988, 989-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Text accompanying note 15 supra.
24
Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333, 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
25
Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Use of the Tenth Circuit's measure of damages would have resulted in a total
liability to the class of $10,239,320, or $28.13 per share representing the difference
between the weighted average selling price of TGS stock during the April 12-16 period
and the cover price. Memorandum of Law in General Counsel in the Above Entitled
Consolidated Action and of Counsel for the Class in Support of Settlement, at 22. The
$2,700,000 settlement provided $2,200,000 to the class and to all other plaintiffs who
claimed losses suffered in reliance on the April 12 press release; the remaining $500,000
went to those plaintiffs who claimed damages based on the sale of TGS stock prior to
public disclosure of TGS's mineral exploration. 55 F.R.D. at 310-11. Problems of proof
would have been virtually insurmountable for these plaintiffs had there been no
settlement. Id. at 317. The District of Utah trial court had rejected a similar claim. 309 F.
Supp.2 6 at 558-59.
Text accompanying note 18 supra.
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Texas Gulf Sulphur,27 and has explicitly done so in several
subsequent cases.28 The issue is a complex one, involving a
delicate balance, and requires closer examination.
II.

LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION-A
MATTER OF POLICY

A number of courts have abandoned the scienter requirement in cases involving face-to-face transactions, holding
negligent as well as fraudulent behavior within the ambit of rule
lOb-5.29 Clearly the extension of this development to include
market transactions would involve no further interpretive strain
upon the statutory provisions. 30 Thus the question whether a
plaintiff should recover damages for negligent misrepresentation
is similar to the threshold question whether a civil damage
remedy ought to be implied under the rule at all; the answer to
both rests on whether such a development advances the
underlying purposes of the securities laws. 31 The overriding
policy considerations behind the federal securities laws were
stated by the Second Circuit in its Texas Gulf Sulphur opinion:
The dominant congressional purposes underlying the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were to promote free
and open public securities markets and to protect the
investing public from suffering inequities in trading,
including, specifically, inequities that follow from
trading that has been stimulated by the publication
3 2 of
false or misleading corporate information releases.
In light of these policies, blanket extension of liability for the full
measure of losses to cases involving negligently prepared,
produces some confusing
misleading corporate press releases
33
and conflicting analytical results.
27

28

Text accompanying note 15 supra.

E.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1305-06 (1973); Cohen v. Franchard
Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 123 (1973).
14 supra.
29Seenote
30
Seenote 1 supra & accompanying text.
31
Cf J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
32401 F.2d at 858. See U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N, A 25 YEAR SUMMARY
ACTIvIIEs OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION xiii (1949).
OF THE
33

Similar dilemmas have been encountered at common law. When the plaintiff's
damages are disproportionate to the defendant's fault, judicial balancing of the equities
has proved a devilish problem. See, e.g., Levitin, Accountants'Scope ofLiabilityFor Defective
FinancialReports,15 HASTINGS LJ. 436, 445 (1964), Seavey, Mr. Justice CardozoAnd The
Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372,400 (1939). For example, injaillet v. Cashman, 235
N.Y. 511, 139 N.E. 714 (1923), the New York Court of Appeals refused to hold the
defendant liable for losses caused by an erroneous investment report that was corrected
45 minutes after it was released. It is likely that the losses were very large, and damages
would have been out of proportion to the fault. Similarly, in the well-known case of
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Several distinct features of actions premised upon negligently prepared corporate press releases must be considered.
First, in the absence of insider trading, there is no profit to be
disgorged. Courts cannot look to unjust enrichment of the
defendant as a justification for liability, nor is there any readily
available pool of funds to compensate victims. Second, the losses
caused by a publicly disseminated misleading release usually far
exceed the ability of the responsible officers to pay. As a result
the corporation must be relied upon to compensate the victims,
and in the final analysis the corporation is simply an aggregation
of shareholders. Although theoretically "responsible" for corporate actions in the sense that their equity is subject to the
claims of persons damaged by the corporation, as a practical
matter shareholders in all but the most closely held firms are
divorced from operations, and are generally as ignorant of the
true facts as the plaintiffs ina rule 10b-5 action.
Third, to the extent that any damages assessed against the
corporation are not borne by its shareholders through a decline
in the value of their stock, they will most probably be passed on
to innocent consumers of the corporation's products. Of course,
the extent to which a corporation can recoup by raising prices in
response to a damage assessment depends in large part on
industry structure and market characteristics. But, to some
extent at least, a corporation will be penalized for the protection
of the investing public at the expense of the larger consuming
public. It is not at all clear that this is a desirable result.
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931), an accountant was
found not liable for damages suffered by the plaintiff in reliance on a negligently
prepared financial statement. Speaking for a unanimous court,Judge Cardozo explained,
"If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder . . . may expose
accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class." Id at 179, 174 N.E. at 449. On the other hand, the same court was
willing to impose liability in a similar factual setting when the damages were small.
Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236; 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
Few courts have rejected the social utilitarianism implicit in Ultramares, and then
only when the defendant knew, or should have known, that the plaintiff was relying on
his report. See Rhode Island Hospital Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner &
Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847, 851 (4th Cir. 1972); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85
(D.R.I. 1968); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 403 (Iowa 1969); Shatterproof Glass
Corp. y. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Hedley Byrne & Co. v.
Heller & Partners, Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 101 (H.L. 1963). These courts have generally done so
on the rationale that the imposition of liability for reasonably foreseeable (or foreseen)
losses would heighten cautionary techniques and would result in a more equitable
distribution of losses. See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, supra, at 91.
This rationale-quality control and risk bearing-is at the core of the problem
whether to impose liability on corporations for materially misleading press releases. The
weight of authority would support nonimposition of liability where the damages are large
and corporate resources are limited; but more recent cases endorse the principle that
there should be liability even if the damages are large and the fault is small. Proper
balancing of these 2 principles in the context of misleading corporate press releases
requires a deeper analysis of conflicting policy goals.

19731
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The deterrent policies of the securities laws demand the
prevention of negligent misrepresentation as well as fraudulent
misrepresentation, for, as noted by the Second Circuit, "the
investing public may be injured as much by one's misleading
statement containing inaccuracies caused by negligence as by a
misleading statement published intentionally to further a
wrongful purpose." 34 Fraud is perhaps more easily deterred by
civil liability than is negligence, but it cannot be doubted that the
fear of civil liability for careless mistakes would reduce the
likelihood of mistakes. Despite the ability of a corporation to
pass on its damages to consumers through cost increases noted
above, the deterrent effect of liability for negligently prepared
releases would likely be significant.
Highly respected jurists have argued, however, that civil
liability for negligent misrepresentation under rule 1Ob-5 would
be counterproductive of the goals and policies of the securities
laws, specifically full disclosure of material information. Judge
Friendly noted:
If the only choices open to a corporation are either to
remain silent and let false rumors do their work, or to
make a communication, not legally required,at the risk of
a slip of the pen or failure properly to amass or weigh
the facts-all judged in the brilliant gleam of
hindsight-will lead to large judgments, payable in the
last analysis by innocent investors, for the benefit of
speculators and their
3 5 lawyers, most corporations would
opt for the former.
Assuming that a corporation does not have a duty to correct
false rumors, the conclusion that the risk of liability for a
negligently insufficient correction would constrict the flow of
information to the public is not as inevitable as Judge Friendly
indicates. The risk of encouraging limitation of the flow of
information is confined to instances in which there is no insider
trading; an insider has an obligation to disclose material
information when he trades in his corporation's securities. If the
securities laws are at all effective it must be assumed that in
situations in which insiders are trading, material information has
been disclosed to the investing public.
Additionally, business rather than legal considerations are
likely to predominate in the decision whether to release
information. 37 Disclosure of unfavorable information to scotch a
34401 F.2d at 860.
35
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (FriendlyJ.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
36Seenotes 40-41 infra & accompanying text.
37
The facts of the TGS litigation provide an excellent example of the dominance of
business considerations. See notes 6-28 supra& accompanying text.
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beneficial rumor can scarcely be expected in any event. A
corporation which may need to increase its capitalization cannot
afford to permit a collapse in the market for its securities due to
an incorrect and uncorrected adverse rumor. Therefore, a
corporate officer apprised of material beneficial information
would usually not be deterred from releasing that information by
the risk of liability due to negligence in the preparation of the
release. The effect of finding liability for negligence would be
limited to encouraging care in the release of information which,
for business reasons, the corporation had already decided to
release.
If this assessment is incorrect, however, or if there exists
neutral information the release of which may depend heavily
upon the legal risks involved,3 8 the conclusion that negligence
should not give rise to civil liability remains unsatisfactory. The
securities laws are concerned with more than the mere quantum
of information released. Of equal or greater importance is the
accuracy of that information. The securities laws are designed to
encourage full and accurate disclosure. Toleration of misleading
statements to encourage greater disclosure is far more destructive of these purposes than insistence upon accurate information
at the risk of discouraging the release of information.
If there is danger that liability for negligence may deter the
correction of false rumors in instances in which correction is not
"legally required,"3 9 the solution which best comports with the
policy favoring full and accurate information is to enforce strict
duties of correction and disclosure, not to shield the corporation
from responsibility for its negligent errors. Such duties of
correction and disclosure do exist; 0 the Tenth Circuit in Mitchell
38By definition it is extremely unlikely that material information will ever be
neutral.
See note 2 supra.
39
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.,
concurring).
40
1n addition to the periodic reports required under § 13 of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78m (1970), the SEC and the exchanges require prompt disclosure of all
material developments. The SEC's policy is stated as follows:
Notwithstanding the fact that a company complies with ... reporting
requirements, it still has an obligation to make full and prompt
announcements of material facts regarding the company's financial
condition ....
Not only must material facts affecting the company's operations be
reported; they must also be reported promptly. Corporate releases which
disclose . . . favorable developments but do not even suggest existing
adverse corporate developments do not serve the public needs and may
violate the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8995, [1970-71 Transfer BinderI CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
77,915 (Oct. 15, 1970).
The New York Stock Exchange has a similar policy: "A corporation.., is expected
to release quickly to the public any news or information which might reasonably be
expected to materially affect the market for securities." NYSE Company Manual A-18.
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rejected the argument that liability for negligence would deter
the release of information, noting that "the duty to disclose facts
when they become material has not been altered by this
decision."41
Admittedly, however, fostering investor protection through
civil liability for the full measure of losses caused by negligently
prepared press releases produces some serious difficulties.
Liability injures a significant segment of the class that the
securities laws were designed to protect.Judge Friendly, quoting
Milton Cohen, rested heavily on this point in his Texas Gulf
Sulphur opinion: "'[AIny remedy imposed against the issuer
itself is indirectly imposed on all holders of the common stock,
usually the most important segment of the total category of
investors intended to be protected.' "42 Although the corporation's common shareholders are the most important class of
investors to be protected, the body of common shareholders are
certainly no more worthy of protection than those who either
bought or sold common stock in reliance upon the misleading
corporate release. Protectio of both groups counsels neither a
total denial nor a total approval of liability, but abalancing of the
interests of all parties and and an apportionment of the losses
release among nonrelying shareholders
caused by the misleading
43
and injured investors.

The assessment of massive damages against the corporation
also works a twofold harm upon the consumer. As already noted,
consumers may be forced to bear significant cost increases due to
the impact of the damage award upon the corporation. There is,
perhaps, an additional risk that the crushing burden of liability
for a "thoughtless slip or blunder" will occasionally drive the
corporation out of business, depriving society of the social and
economic benefits of corporate growth.
Resolution of these conflicting policies is difficult, but the
denial of liability and the concomitant absence of compensation
and deterrence is totally unsatisfactory. To permit the size of the
damage award and its adverse consequences to the defendant to
dictate the standard of culpability is theoretically distasteful. It is
preferable to attempt to deter all misrepresentation, and to
permit the degree of culpability to modify the extent of liability.
It is, therefore, suggested that liability be found in all cases
The American Stock Exchange explains its policy as follows: "A listed company is
required to make immediate public disclosure of all material information concerning its
affairs, except in exceptional circumstances." ASE Company Guide 101.
4'446 F.2d at 100.
42401 F.2d at 866-67 (quoting Cohen, Truth in Securities Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REv.
1340, 1370 (1967)).
43
Seenotes 47-57 infra& accompanying text.
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involving negligently prepared, misleading corporate press
releases, and that the competing policies be accommodated in
the assessment of damages.44
III. TWO APPROACHES TO LIMITING LIABILITY
A. A Percentage-of-EarningsApproach
One way to avoid crippling the corporate defendant while
retaining the principles of deterrence and compensation in the
case of a negligently misleading release would be to tie the
payment of the award to corporate earnings. This can be done in
either of two ways. First, the damage award might be expressed
as a percentage of corporate earnings over a period of time
extending forward from the date of judgment. Second, the award
could be fixed in amount, but paid out over time out of earnings.
Under either method, the greater ease of payment would reflect
the corporation's reduced degree of fault; the corporation could
continue as a going concern; and plaintiffs would receive
significant compensation for their losses.
The former approach of tying the size of the damage award
to earnings creates some potential for abuse; it would encourage
a corporation to hide its earnings or defer them to a later period,
if possible. A corporation that tried to juggle its books could,
however, expose itself, its officers and employees to further civil
or criminal liability for fraud; and plaintiffs benefiting from the
award could be expected to perform a watchdog role. In aid of its
judgment a court also could order that the plaintiffs be permitted
reasonable access to the corporation's books. In any event,
business considerations would
be a counterinfluence opposing
45
understatement of earnings.
The potential for abuse is eliminated under the latter
percentage-of-earnings approach, in which earnings affect not
the size of the award, but only the length of time over which it is
paid. The only effect of deferral or concealment of earnings
would be to permit "borrowing" of funds interest-free from the
plaintiffs. The incentive to do so would be eliminated by
44For the purpose of discussion this Comment assumes that courts will not feel
strictly bound by traditional methods of computing damages. While the approaches
outlined here are novel, they should be available to a federal court fashioning a federal
remedy. See note 5 supra. Other issues relevant to the propriety of using such approaches
are discussed
at notes 58-75 infra & accompanying text.
45The necessity of maintaining a strong financial image among investors would severely restrict the advantages of deliberately deferring or misstating profits. The
securities of a corporation carrying a substantial damage judgment as a drain on earnings
will not be highly marketable; management would be ill-advised to understate earnings
and risk destroying this already-weakened market.
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allowing interest to accrue on the unpaid portion of the award 6
This approach also has the advantage of allowing damages to be
fixed in amount at the time of judgment. It is probably the better
of the two percentage-of earnings approaches, though both
adequately deal with the danger of burdening the corporation
with destructive damages.
B. An Adjusted Pro Rata Loss Theory of Damages
The observation that the corporation's sharehblders, who
bear the burden of a damage award, are as innocent as the
plaintiffs suggests another method of measuring damagesnamely, apportioning the losses among the plaintiffs and the
47
shareholders on the basis of their relative stock ownership.
Each plaintiff and each shareholder would bear the same loss per
share of stock. This approach would view compensation of the
plaintiffs on a par with protecting the investments of the
corporation's innocent shareholders. The damage figure assessed
against the corporation would generally be less than the total
losses suffered as a result of the misrepresentation, 48 but would
assure the plaintiffs some measure of compensation and would
deterrent to negligence in the preparation
provide a substantial
49
of releases.
46

The Tenth Circuit in Mitchell approved the recovery of interest from the time of
until the date of the trial court's judgment. 446 F.2d at 106.
sale 47
For purposes of the immediate discussion, plaintiffs and shareholders are
considered to be mutually exclusive groups. The case which involves plaintiff
shareholders will be discussed shortly.
48As will soon be shown, the damage award will be equal to the total losses in the case
all plaintiffs are shareholders.
in which
49Clearly the most effective deterrent would be provided by the assessment of
direct fine against the individuals responsible for the negligent misrepresentation. The
direct deterrent could be a fixed fine per misrepresentation, or could be a percentage of
each individual's income. A direct deterrent could easily be combined with the adjusted
pro rata loss method or the percentage-of-corporate earnings method of determining the
corporation's liability. Complete treatment of the advisability and feasibility of such a
direct deterrent is beyond the scope of this Comment, but several observations are in
order.
The direct deterrent loses most of its effectiveness if the corporation indemnifies the
responsible individuals for their loss. A court determined to assess an effective direct
deterrent must be prepared to set aside by-laws and statutes that perinit indemnification.
The New York and Delaware statutes permit indemnification of officers against
expenses, judgments, fines, and amounts paid in settlement in connection with a suit, if
the officer acted in good faith and in a manner which he reasonably believed to be in the
best interests of the corporation. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 723 (McKinney 1963); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (Supp. 1970). These statutes appear to permit indemnification in

most cases of negligent misrepresentation. (For a criticism of the permissiveness of the
Delaware statute in this respect, see Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in
Indemnification of CorporateDirectorsand Officers, 77 YALE LJ. 1078, 1081-85 (1968).) In
some cases courts have ignored or circumvented statutory indemnification provisions
when they found breaches of duty. See eg., SEC v. Continental Growth Fund, CCH FED.
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The mechanics of determining the damage figure which
would produce a proportional allocation of losses among the
shareholders and the plaintiffs would differ in the several
possible situations in which suits could arise: (1) the plaintiffs are
sellers; (2) the plaintiffs are buyers, all of whom have since sold
their stock; (3) the plaintiffs are buyers, all of whom hold their
stock at the time of the judgment; and (4) the plaintiffs are
buyers, some of whom hold their stock at the time of judgment
and some of whom have sold their stock.
In the first two cases, the plaintiffs and the shareholders are
two mutually exclusive groups, and it is a simple matter to
calculate each group's proportional share of the losses. If, for
example, the plaintiffs lost $5 million through the sale of 500,000
shares of stock, and there were at the time of judgment 2 million
outstanding shares, the $5 million loss would be apportioned
among
the and
total the
number of shares represented by the plaintiffs
(500,000)
current shareholders (2 million) at $5
million/2.5 million shares, or $2 per share. The corporation
would pay damages of $2 x 2 million, or $4 million, and the
plaintiffs would bear $2 x 500,000, or $1 million of the loss.
Stated algebraically, if L is the total loss suffered in reliance upon
the misrepresentation, Sa is the number of shares once held by
the plaintiffs, and S is the number of outstanding shares, the
formula for arriving at the proper damage award (D) would be:
D=L (S--

)

In the third case of plaintiff-buyers who hold all of their
stock at the time of the judgment, the plaintiffs and the
shareholders are not two mutually exclusive groups. If the
adjusted pro rata loss theory sought merely a proportional
allocation between two potentially overlapping groups (plaintiffs
and shareholders) and were not concerned about the overlap,
then the damages to be assessed against the corporation would be
calculated according to the formula derived for the first two
cases. But the adjusted pro rata loss theory seeks to allocate losses
proportionately among all the individuals who are now shareholders or plaintiffs. The two groups between which the theory
seeks to divide the losses on a pro rata basis are the mutually
SEC. L. REP.
91,437 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963);
Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 182 A.2d 647 (Ch. 1962).
It is submitted that the overriding federal policy of deterring violations of rule lOb-5
offers justification for refusing indemnification, regardless of the provisions of state law
and corporate by-laws. See Note, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (1963). For a more complete
discussion of corporate indemnification, see G. WASHINGTON &J. BISHOP, INDEMNIFYING
THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE (1963); Bishop, SittingDucks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in
the Indemnification of Corporate Directorsand Officers, 77 YALE hJ. 1078 (1968); Sebring,
Recent Legislative Changes in the Law of Indemnification of Directors,Officers and Others, 23
BUS.LAW.95 (1967); Note, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (1963).
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exclusive groups of plaintiffs (whether shareholders or not) and
nonplaintiff shareholders. It is essential, therefore, that the
calculation of the damage award in the third case take account of
the fact that the plaintiffs, as shareholders, would bear a portion
of the burden of their own damage award. Once it is
acknowledged that the plaintiff shareholder's net loss includes
both his uncompensated loss and his portion of the corporation's
damage burden, it becomes clear that in cases in which all
plaintiffs retain all their shares, a pro rata allocation can only be
attained by charging the corporation with liability for the full
measure of the losses sustained as a result of the misrepresentation. Both the plaintiff shareholders and the nonplaintiff
shareholders would suffer their pro rata loss by virtue of the
decrease in value of each share of their stock.
Many cases involving plaintiff-buyers will fall into the
fourth category of cases, in which some of the plaintiffs hold their
stock at the time of the judgment and some have sold their stock
by that time.5 ° It is possible to derive for these cases a somewhat
complicated damage formula that will allocate to the plaintiffs
shareholders their pro rata share of the total
and 5the
1 nonplaintiff

loss.

Liability insurance also poses a threat to the effectiveness of a direct deterrent
assessed against the responsible individuals. Corporate employees can purchase policies
covering negligence, and their corporate employers can purchase the policies for them. It
should be impermissible to defeat the federal policy of deterring rule lOb-5 violation by
purchasing such insurance. For a more complete discussion of corporate liability
insurance, see Bishop, New Curefor an OldAilment: InsuranceAgainst Directors'and Officers'
Liability, 22 Bus. LAW. 92 (1966); Note, Liability Insurance for Corporate Executives, 80
HARV. L. REV. 648 (1967); Note, Public Policy and Directors' Liability Insurance, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 716 (1967).

50
A plaintiff who sold some shares and retained others would fall within both classes.
Under the formula developed in note 51 infra, his shares would be allocated between the
two relevant classifications.
3'Where a is the group of plaintiffs who remain shareholders, b is the group of
plaintiffs who sold their shares, and c is the group of nonplaintiff shareholders, NLI is
the net loss of group i, and Si is the number of shares represented by group i, the
damage award should produce a situation in which each group bears the same
per-share loss, i.e.

NL

- NLb

Sa

Sb

-

NL,
SC

Where L, is the initial loss suffered by group i, and Pi is the amount which group i
recovers from the corporation, the net loss of each group is as follows:
(2)

NLa=La-Pa+I Sa

(P+P)

The final term, which is a's contribution, as corporate shareholders, to the
corporation's damage payment, is eliminated in considering the net loss of those
plaintiffs who sold their shares:
(3)

NLb = Lb - Pb

And finally:

(4)

NL = ( Se;S(P+ Pb
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In each of the four situations discussed, adjustments can be
made in the formulas to increase the relative share of the loss
sustained by the corporation. Any one of three considerations
could lead a court to make such adjustments: the court may feel
that the shareholders of the corporation are in some sense less
innocent than the plaintiffs, and therefore ought to bear a
proportionally larger share of the loss;52 the court may want to
The only unknown terms in these equations are P. and Pb. The sum of these two
terms is the proper damage award. Substituting these values for net loss into the first
set of equations (1), and solving those equations simultaneously, we arrive at the
following values for P. and Pb:
(5)
(6)

Pa0 = L., and
Pb= SLb
- SL
Sa - + SCLb
Sb + S,

0

Once again the plaintiff shareholders receive an award equal to their damages,
although their net benefit is reduced, by the corporation's contribution to the plaintiff
nonshareholders, who in turn, being disassociated from the corporation, must pay
their share of the award to the plaintiff shareholders out of the cash award. The
corporation's damage payment (D) should be:
(7)

+ ScLb - SbL
Sa + Sb + S,

D = La + SaLb

Using this formula, if the plaintiffs in group a held I share and suffered a loss of
$20, the plaintiffs in group b suffered a $30 loss in selling 2 shares, and group c
nonplaintiff shareholders held 5 shares, the corporation would pay $37.50 in damages,
of which $17.50 would be paid to the plaintiffs who sold and $20 would be paid to the
plaintiff shareholders. Each group would thereby suffer a net loss per share of $6.25.
52 1n the case in which all plaintiffs retain their stock, this adjustment would
produce a damage award larger than the amount of total losses. A court would
understandably be unwilling to make such an adjustment. In the other cases discussed,
the adjustment could increase the damage award without pushing it over the total
amount of losses.
The adjustment can be demonstrated in the most complicated case-the case
involving plaintiff buyers, some of whom retain their stock and some of whom have
sold their stock. The adjustment would be made by redefining the desired result
expressed in the first set of equations in note 51 supra to indicate that the nonplaintiff
shareholders should bear more than their proportionate share of the loss. A factor of
less than
would be inserted before the final term of that equation, which stands
for group c's net loss per share, as follows:

()

(1)

s° -

NLa

,

NLb

1\ /NLC\
0bk),-T

The derivation of the damage award would then proceed as in note 51 supra.
Although group a in the above equation (the group of plaintiff shareholders)
obviously contains shareholders, the factor 1 should not be added to the first term of
the equation, which stands for the plaintiff shareholders' per-share loss. Shareholders
who held their shares at the time of the misrepresentation might be thought to be
responsible for the misrepresentation in the sense that they, theoretically at least, were
responsible for choosing the negligent officers. And nonplaintiff shareholders who
purchased shares after the misrepresentation would be responsible in the same way
that they are responsible for all contingent liabilities of the corporation. But it would
be unreasonable to suggest that a purchaser of shares should be held to assume any
portion of the corporation's responsibility for negligently inducing him to purchase the
corporation's stock. Therefore the plaintiff shareholders are in a different position
from the nonplaintiff shareholders.
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account for the likelihood that the corporation's damage
payments would produce less than a dollar-for-dollar decline in
the value of its stock; 53 or the court may want to account for the
fact that when the damage award is deducted from the
corporation's taxable income, 54 the corporation's net loss, and
the shareholders'
net loss, are reduced by virtue of the tax
55
savings.
Apportionment of losses under the adjusted pro rata loss
theory would adequately serve the competing policies that must
be considered in determining liability for negligent misrepresentations. It would supply a significant deterrent and would
provide a substantial measure of compensation. At the same time
While this note has demonstrated how a court could take into account its belief that
the shareholders are less innocent than the plaintiffs, it is submitted that it is a fiction to
speak of fault at all in the context of shareholders and plaintiffs. Allocation of losses
should be made without regard to notions of the relative degree of fault as between
shareholders
and plaintiffs.
53
To make this adjustment, the court would be required to derive a fraction that
stands for the decrease in the aggregate value of all outstanding stock which would result
from each dollar of damages. In the derivation of a damage formula in note 51 supra, the
expression for NLin the fourth equation in note 51 supra and the comparable expression
in the second equation for ds contribution to the damage payment would be multiplied
by that fraction.
54Expenses incurred by a corporation in issuing stock are treated as nondeductible
capital outlays. General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712 (8th Cir.
1964) (stock dividend expense); Simmons Co. v. Commissioner, 33 F.2d 75 (Ist Cir.
1929); Pacific Coast Biscuit Co., 32 B.T.A. 39 (1935); Commercial Inv. Trust Corp., 28
B.T.A. 143 (1933), afid per curiam, 74 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1935); Rev. Rul. 67-125,
1967-1 CuM. BuLL. 31; B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS,

§ 5.04(4),

at 5-14 (3d ed. 1971).

But in the cases with which we are dealing, the corporation which incurs liability for
misrepresentation is not engaged in the issuance of stock or in any other activity which
would cause the damage payment to be categorized as a capital outlay. It might be
suggested that in the Texas GulfSulphurcase, the damage award was an expense incurred
in the purchase of land in that TGS would have had to pay a higher price for the land if it
had chosen to issue an accurate report. But that suggestion assumes that the
misrepresentation was a deliberate one. If it was deliberate, then a fully compensatory
award would be granted, and there would be no need to consider tax consequences in
arriving at a compromise measure of damages which is fair to all parties.
Damage payments for negligently prepared releases would not fall within the
exceptions under the public policy doctrine to the rule of deductions for all "ordinary
and necessary" business expenses. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a). Sections 162(c),(f),
and (g), added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, provide that no deductions shall be
allowed for certain illegal payments, fines, and antitrust damage payments. But damage
payments in lob-5 cases do not fall within any of these specific exceptions, and the Senate
Report stated that the new statutory coverage "is intended to be all inclusive" and that
"public policy, in other circumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly defined to
justify the disallowance of the deductions." S. REP. No. 91-552,91st Cong., 1st Sess. 274
(1969). For a discussion of the provisions added in 1969 and the applicability of the
public policy doctrine in situations not covered by those provisions, see Taggart, Fines,
Penalties,Bribes, and DamagePayments and Recoveries , 25 TAxL. REv. 611 (1970).
55
In the derivation of a damage formula in note 51 supra, the expression for NL¢ in
the fourth equation and the comparable expression in the fourth equation for as
contribution to the damage payment would be multiplied by a fraction equal to 1 minus
the corporation's net tax rate.
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it would allay to some extent fears that negligent mistakes would
expose corporations to destructive liability and innocent shareholders to undeserved losses. The adjusted pro rata loss
approach to measuring damages could be combined with a
percentage-of-earnings schedule of payment5 6 to reduce further
the debilitating effects of large damage awards.
The adjusted pro rata loss theory also contains a special
safeguard against crushing liability in actions brought by large
plaintiff classes. Under the theory, the corporation's proportionate share of the losses is inversely related to the relative
number of plaintiffs (the number of plaintiffs in relation to the
number of shareholders). And to the extent that the relative
amount of the losses (the amount of the losses in relation to the
corporation's net worth) is directly related to the relative
number of plaintiffs, the corporation's proportionate share of the
losses is also inversely related to the relative amount of the losses.
In cases in which a relatively large number of plaintiffs suffer
huge losses-cases which pose the greatest threat to the
corporation and its shareholders under a system of all-ornothing liability-the corporation would bear a relatively small
share of the losses. 57 Only in cases in which a relatively small
number of plaintiffs suffer losses would the corporation bear a
relatively large share of those losses. The adjusted pro rata loss
approach would offer little protection to the corporation in such
cases if plaintiffs were to suffer aggregate losses which were large
in relation to the corporation's net worth.
The risk remains under the adjusted pro rata loss approach
that a significant portion of the damage award will be passed on
to consumers in the form of price increases. But this risk is
inherent in any situation involving significant business losses,
and is probably beyond the control of a court fashioning damage
remedies.
IV.

ADOPTION OF A BALANCING THEORY OF DAMAGES

A.

JudicialPower to Apportion Losses

The suggestion that courts should find liability under rule
10b-5 for negligent misrepresentation in corporate releases,
56
Seetext
57

accompanying notes 45-46 supra.

0f course, the accuracy of this observation is decreased to the extent that plaintiffs

are also shareholders. Thus, for example, in the case in which the plaintiffs were buyers,
all of whom retained their stock, the corporation would bear the entire loss under the
adjusted pro rata loss approach. But this qualification of the special safeguard is of limited
consequence, for to the extent that the safeguard is not operative-that is, to the extent
that the plaintiffs are shareholders-there is less need for the safeguard-that is, there is
less need to protect the shareholders at the expense of the plaintiffs.

1973]

RULE lOb-5: APPORTIONMENT OF LOSSES

limiting damages to an amount which is fair to all parties, has
received support from previous commentators. 58 It does conflict,
however, with the traditional tort principle that the parties who
are legally responsible for someone else's loss should be liable for
the full measure of that loss. But in fashioning remedies "to make
effective the congressional purpose,

' 59

courts should not feel

bound by the principles of tort law.60 Liability for the full
measure of losses may be an inappropriate sanction for
negligently prepared releases, as to which the very question of
liability involves the delicate balancing of competing policy
considerations. It is the assertion of this Comment that the
balance should be struck in favor of liability, but the equilibrium
point may fall short of liability for all losses suffered.
The concept of limiting recoverable damages is hardly
novel. The Warsaw Convention imposes limitations on a
passenger's damages for personal injury or death caused by an
aviation accident.6 1 Some states limit damages under their
wrongful death statutes, 62 and the Uniform Commercial Code
explicitly approves contractual provisions placing reasonable
limitations on damages. 63 Similary, in criminal cases mitigating
circumstances do not bar conviction, but are reflected in the
sentence eventually imposed.
But despite the Supreme Court's invitation to judicial
innovation in 7.1 Case Co. v. Borak,64 there is little, if any, direct
•582 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 8.4 (508), at 204.113-15 (1971);

Sandier & Conwill, Texas Gulf Sulphur: Reform in the Securities Marketplace,30 OHIO ST.
LJ. 225, 273-75 (1969); Feuerstein, The Corporation's Obligations of Disclosure under the
FederalSecurities Laws When It Is Not Trading in Its Stock, 15 N.Y.L.F 385, 401-03 (1969).
For the view that something more than negligence should be shown in order for a
corporation to be liable for any damages caused by a misleading release, see E. GADSBY,
1l-a BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: SECURITIES REGULATION § 5.03 [21 [b] [i] (1973); W.
PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 246 (1968); Fleisher, "Federal

CorporationLaw": An Assessment, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1146, 1157 (1965);Jennings, Insider
Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure Obligations Under
Rule 1Ob-5, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 809,826,828 n.88 (1968);'Ruder, Texas Gulf SulphurThe Second Round: Privity and State ofMind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw.
U.L. REV. 423, 444-45 n. 107 (1968); Recent Case, 82 HARV. L. REV. 938, 947-50
(1969); Note, CivilLiability Under Section lOB'andRule 1OB-5: A SuggestionforReplacing the
Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658,688 (1965). For a very interesting and novel analysis
of the problem of rule 10b-5 liability and the conflicting standards of negligence and
scienter, see Mann, Rule l0b-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch
PhrasesofNegligence andScienter,45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1206 (1970).
59.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,433 (1964).
r Speech by Robert H. Mundheim to the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, Damages Under Rule lob-5 (How High is Up.), May 19, 1969, at 6.
'1)49
Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876 (1934).
62
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1903 (Supp. 1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229

(Supp. 1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.090; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 556:13 (Supp.
1970); VA. CODEANN. § 8-636 (Supp. 1973); W. VA. CODEANN. § 55-7-6 (Supp. 1972);
WIS.6 STAT.
§ 895.04(4) (Supp. 1973).
3
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2-718, 719.
h4377 U.S. 426 (1964). Seenote 5 supra.
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support for judicially imposed limitations on damages. On rare
occasions, courts have apportioned damages in cases in which
both parties were at fault. For example, the admiralty practice of
dividing losses equally in collision cases involving contributory
fault is a judge-made rule. 5 Georgia's rule of comparative
negligence, apportioning damages between the plaintiff and
defendant when both are negligent, was also developed
judicially before its codification. 6 The experience of Georgia,
however, is the exception rather than the rule. Despite strong
support among commentators for the apportionment of tort
losses through a scheme of comparative negligence,6 7 most
courts have felt that if the longstanding rule of contributory
negligence is to be discarded,
legislatures rather than courts
68
should be responsible.
Judicial reluctance to abandon the judge-made rule of
contributory negligence in favor of a rule of comparative
negligence is due primarily to concern over the far-reaching
effects of the change and the difficulty of formulating a
comprehensive plan for apportioning losses in cases involving
varied relative degrees of fault among plaintiffs and defendants.
Commentators have offered arguments which drain such
concerns of much of their force. 69 But granting the cogency of
these judicial concerns in the case of comparative negligence,
they are of far less significance when applied to the differing
situation of liability under rule 10b-5 for negligently prepared
releases. The effects of apportioning losses in the corporate
release cases would not be as far-reaching as those of judicial
adoption of a rule of comparative negligence. Comparative
negligence would apply to all tort cases, and would arguably
decrease the incentive to act with due care. Apportionment of
losses caused by a negligently prepared press release would be
limited to specific situations arising under a specific statute. In
view of existing law in the Second Circuit, offering corporations
65

The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854); R. KEETON,

VENTURING ToDoJUSTICE46-47 (1969).
66R. KEETON, supranote65, at 46-47.
6

.See, eg., 2 F. HARPER & F.JAMES, TORTS §§ 22.1-.3, at 1193-209; 6 22.11, at 1236-41
(1956); W. PROSSER, TORTS 433-39 (4th ed. 1971); Maloney, From Contributory to
ComparativeNegligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 135 (1958); Mole &
Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence (2 parts), 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 604 (1932);
Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MICH. L. REV. 689
(1960); Philbrick, Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases (2 parts), 99 U. PA. L. REV. 572,
766 68
(1951).
See, e.g., Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968), rev'g85 Ill. App. 2d
439, 69229 N.E.2d 284 (1967).
See, e.g., id at 196-97, 239 N.E.2d at 447; R. KEETON, supra note 60, at 46;James,
Kalven, Keeton, Leflar, Malone & Wade, Comments on Maki v. Frelk- Comparative v.
ContributoryNegligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 889, 918,
920-21 (1968) (Comment of R. Leflar).
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complete escape from liability for negligence,70 apportionment
would increase the incentive to act with due care. The difficulties
inherent in the formulation of a comprehensive comparative
negligence plan to deal with variations in the relative fault of
plaintiffs and defendants are not present in the apportionment of
losses caused by a negligently prepared release, involving
innocent plaintiffs and shareholders responsible only because of
their relationship to the culpable individuals.
Thus, judicial reluctance to abandon the rule of contributory
negligence should not preclude judicial adoption of a scheme
apportioning losses caused by a negligently prepared press
release. While there is little direct support for judicial apportionment of losses, there are no bars to such apportionment. If cogent
arguments can be advanced in support of limitation of damages
through the apportionment of losses, courts should respond to
those arguments by adopting such a scheme.
B.

A voiding Arbitrarinessand Setting Standards

Any theory of damages other than that which is strictly
compensatory must necessarily involve the exercise of discretion
and judgments that are ultimately arbitrary. The adjusted pro
rata loss theory minimizes the degree of arbitrariness, however.
Of course, courts could depart from an equal pro rata sharing of
the loss in favor of imposing a larger proportion on the
nonplaintiff shareholders, reintroducing a significant element of
discretion.
In choosing among damage awards which do not compensate fully, the courts would do well to look to the standards
which have guided them when their awards more than
compensate-that is, when they award punitive damages. There
are no rigid formulas or fixed standards for determining the
proper measure of punitive damages. 7 1 Juries are given wide
discretion to tailor punitive damage awards to fit the particular
circumstances.7 2 The most useful guideline provided by the
courts is that the punitive damages should bear some reasonable
relation to the harm done and the flagrancy of the conduct
involved, although the defendant's circumstances may be
70
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considered as well.7 3 Such generalizations are of limited utility,
but it is unlikely that any more specific guidelines can be devised
to cover the diverse circumstances under which the courts may
be called upon to award damages for negligently prepared
releases.
The lack of specific, easily applied standards may be a
source of discomfort to the courts, but it should not restrict them
to an all-or-nothing approach to liability. Once the conflicting
policy considerations are acknowledged, an all-or-nothing
approach becomes more arbitrary than an approach which
reflects a resolution of those conflicts in the assessment of
damages.
V. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Courts should feel free to balance conflicting policies in
computing damages, finding liability for negligently prepared
releases and developing a compromise measure of damages
reflecting those considerations. But the scarcity of precedent for
judicial apportionment of loss will most probably deter courts
from adopting such a theory of damages under rule 10b-5 for
misleading releases. Thus, legislative action establishing a
compromise measure of damages may be desirable. If apportionment of loss is the preferable approach-and it certainly is
preferable to having those who innocently relied on the
misrepresentation bear their entire loss-legislative action offers
the advantage of ensuring universal application and relatively
speedy adoption of an apportionment theory.
Congressional authorization of apportionment of damages
should be restricted to a limited class of cases involving negligent
conduct and losses which, if imposed on the corporation, would
have a destructive impact. In cases involving fraud, the present
rule holding the corporation liable for all losses 74 should not be
eroded. When conduct is negligent but imposition of the full
measure of compensation would not have a destructive impact
on the corporation, the public interest is best served by a fully
73
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compensatory damage award. Of course, although it could enact
standards that would encourage and guide judicial action,
Congress should not attempt to define precisely what amount of
loss would have a destructive impact. This determination is
better left to the courts, which can analyze such factors as the
corporation's assets and earnings on a case-by-case basis.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The worst solution to the problems posed by negligently
prepared releases is to excuse the issuer of the misstatement,
shielding him from liability in the interests of protecting
innocent shareholders and encouraging the release of information. Healthy securities markets depend upon full and accurate
disclosure, and investors are injured as much by negligent
misstatements as by deliberate ones. The primary concerns of
courts should be to deter such misstatements and to provide
compensation to those who suffered in reliance upon the
misrepresentation. Concern over hurting innocent shareholders
should be tempered by recognition that by taking an ownership
interest in the corporation, the shareholders assume the risk that
the corporate officers will make poor business decisions or incur
civil liability. Courts cannot escape the reality that excusing the
corporation and its shareholders means imposing the losses
caused by the corporation on those who innocently relied upon
the corporation's misrepresentation. The theoretical and policy
justifications for imposing liability upon the corporation and its
shareholders are stronger than those for imposing the losses on
innocent reliant parties.
Although protection of the investing public requires that
economic sanctions be imposed for all misrepresentations, willful
or merely negligent, courts must also be sensitive to the
destructive impact which such liability can have upon corporations and their shareholders. Limited liability for negligent
misrepresentations may be the only approach which adequately
safeguards the interests of all parties-the corporation and its
shareholders, the investors who suffered in reliance upon the
misrepresentation, the investing public at large, and the broader
consuming public which benefits from the continuation of the
corporation's activity and, indirectly, from a healthy investing
atmosphere. Statutory approval ofthe apportionment of losses in
instances of negligently prepared press releases would insure the
immediate universal application of an apportionment theory.
However, in the absence of congressional action, the courts
themselves should move to impose liability but limit recoverable
damages.

